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Recently, the European Securities and Markets Authority has aimed to reinvigorate its efforts 
to enforce the increase in competition within the credit rating industry. The Supervisory 
Provisions aim to explain, in precise detail, the rules and regulations for ‘Sectoral 
Competent Authorities’ with regards to enforcing the usage of rating agencies that have less 
than 10% of the European market share, particularly when an issuer issues structured-
finance products that require two or more ratings. However, in this article we will look at the 
chances of this artificial push to increase competition actually working and see, through 
analysing the perspectives of market players, that the will of the regulator with regards to the 
credit rating industry is, unfortunately, irrelevant – only investors can affect the dominance 




The European Union, like the United States, has sought to regulate the credit rating industry 
much more since the Financial Crisis, which can be seen by the implementation of the 
relevant sections of the Dodd-Frank Act of 20101 in the U.S., and the three ‘CRA 
Regulations’ that were adopted in 2009, 2011, and finally in 20132 in the E.U. However, for 
the most part, the aims of these legislative agendas have not been met. One of the most 
obvious aims of the agendas was to remove the largest rating agencies – Standard & Poor’s, 
Moody’s, and Fitch Ratings – from within the fibres of the economy, and to do this the 
legislation both sought to remove the regulatory reliance upon the agencies i.e. remove 
reference to the agencies in any regulations governing other financial sectors (like Broker-
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dealers, for example), and artificially increase competition to lessen the stranglehold that the 
so-called ‘Big Three’ (and particularly S&P and Moody’s) have over the marketplace. Yet, 
even though these provisions exist on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, no progress has been 
made on this front in over a decade since the Crisis. In this article we will discuss the latest 
move by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the E.U.’s chief financial 
regulator, to initiate the increase in competition that the legislation envisioned. In doing so we 
will be introduced to a number of inherent problems in this area, but particular attention will 
be paid to the concept of position. After analysing the proposed provisions by the ESMA, we 
will see that their aims still remain optional, with issuers who go against the stated aims of 
the regulations just having to explain why. Ultimately, we will understand that the desires 
ofor the regulators are just that – they are desires. In reality, it is the requirements of the 
investors that dictate the direction of this area of finance and, ultimately, these regulatory 
provisions do little to change that dynamic. 
 
The E.U. Tries Again 
 
The E.U.’s cumulative attempts to regulate the credit rating industry, for the first time, were 
supposedly very clear. The most recent piece of legislation – CRA Regulation III – makes 
clear its intentions, with regards to lessening the grip of the Big Three, when it mandates its 
agencies to ‘delete references to credit ratings for regulatory purposes from financial 
regulation’3, and ‘measures should be taken to encourage the use of smaller credit rating 
agencies [by way of] where two or more credit ratings are sought, the issuer or a related third 
party should consider appointing at least one credit rating agency which does not have more 
than 10% of the total market share’4. In specific relation to the issuance of structured-finance 
products – which were at the centre of the Crisis -, the E.U. dictates that whereere the issuer 
does not select a smaller agency, then this decision must be ‘documented’5 so that the 
decision can be reviewed by the relevant agencies if needs be. 
 
                                                 
3 Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 [2013] OJ L146/1 (8). 
4 ibid (11). 
5 ibid (Art. 8c). 
Yet, anyone who has looked even remotely closely at the rating industry and its dynamics 
knows that the wording of the legislation is its own downfall. In order to have this sector run 
as one wants, the wording of any regulation must be water-tight, and reviewing the legislation 
above we can clearly see that it is not. Firstly, the aim that measures ‘should’ be taken is not 
forceful enough, which is an understatement for the declaration that should an issuer not 
obtain the services of a smaller agency, then all they must do is document the reason why. 
The obvious ‘gaps in the net’ that this wording produced has been recognised by the ESMA 
in its recent briefings. In its ‘Supervisory Briefing’, published on the 6th April 2017, the 
ESMA concede that ‘unfortunately, successful implementation of these Articles has been 
hindered by a lack of clarity in a number of key areas’6, with the report focusing upon the 
issues regarding which issuers precisely are captured by the requirements, and how the 
requirement to ‘document’ should be met. The report goes further, with regards to the issue 
of competition, by discussing the fact that, predictablybizarrely, ‘while some larger CRAs 
believe competition within the CRA industry has increased, this view is not shared by smaller 
CRAs and new entrants’7. For the ESMA, the remedy for these issues is for the relevant 
‘Sectoral Competent Authorities’ (SCAs) – i.e. the designated regulatory agencies tasked 
with monitoring the rating agencies in each individual member state – to converge and act as 
one in ‘encouraging’ compliance with this legislative agenda. Rather depressingly, the ESMA 
then proceeds to clarify the position within the legislation, and proceeds to repeat the very 
same rules as stated in the legislation i.e. the rules were clear in the first place. If an issuer 
issues a product that requires two or more ratings – as structured products do – then they are 
obliged to consider using a smaller agency, and if they do not do so then they must document 
why; that has not changed since the rule was enacted, but apparently needed to be spelled out. 
The ESMA conclude by urging SCAs to work together more to enforce these rules, but 
reading the tone of the report can only result in one conclusion – it is, and can only be, a 
fruitless endeavour. Yet, why is this the case? The rules were clear and fair, yet they were not 
followed. The reason lies in the concept of what this article is calling position. 
 
‘Position’ 
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 The tone of the ESMA’s report is one of dejection; it merely repeats the rules of the statute 
whilst confirming that not everyone is paying attention. The reason for this, which alludes to 
a continuing problem in this sector, is that the regulators and legislators are not acting with 
reality in mind; they are making regulations with how they desire the rating agencies and 
their associated parties to act, rather than focusing upon how actually perform. This naivety, 
for want of a better term, is demonstrated clearly by the push to artificially promote 
competition in the credit rating industry. It is naïve because even a cursory glance at the 
literature on this subject confirms the presence of what is called a ‘natural oligopoly’, which 
means that there a number of factors that dictate that competition is a negative for the way 
the industry works, not a positive8. Before we continue, it is important to note that this author, 
along with many others, recognise that the dissolution of the stranglehold of the Big Three is 
what is required, but achieving that is another story entirely; operating with that aim in mind, 
but not considering the reality of the situation, is a fool’s errand. This is because the natural 
oligopolistic features of the rating industryagency dictate that focusing upon the actions of 
the rating agencies, or the issuers, is to miss the point entirely. For example, it is has been 
noted that, in terms of the organisational elements of the industry, ‘new entrants have high 
start-up costs related to acquiring the requisite staffing, analytical tools and information 
technology systems, and few resources with which to meet these costs’9, which ultimately 
means that the only agencies that can rate often highly complex issuances are the ones who 
have large resources with which to do so. However, there is a bigger issue and that is, 
existentially, who actually uses these ratings?  
 
Rather than looking at the performance of the rating agencies, or even the issuers, this article 
calls for the regulators and legislators to instead focus upon the requirements and ‘position’ 
of the users of the ratings, and that is the investors. In the literature it is understood that 
investors’ ‘desire for consistency across investment products helps to sustain reliance on the 
few incumbents in the credit rating market’10, whilst others have noted that the financial 
markets contain ‘investors with a limited capacity to assimilate and process information… 
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therefore always result[ing] in an investor-driven natural oligopoly’11. One can take issue 
with this last sentiment, because not all investors have this ‘limited capacity’, particularly not 
large ‘institutional investors’. However, looking at institutional investors more closely, we 
can see that the natural oligopolistic sentiments strike again, because the managers of 
institutional investors are often constrained by their shareholders, or the equivalent, by way 
of ‘agency’ – i.e. dispersed interested persons can regulate the activities of managers by only 
allowing them to invest in products and securities that carry high ratings, for example, or can 
enforce investment strategy by using certain rating movements as ‘triggers’, so when an 
entity’s rating drops below a certain point, the investment managers must divest from that 
particular holding12. Ultimately, the relative ease for people to understand the supposed value 
of an ‘AAA’ rating over a ‘C’ rating, for example, makes it easier for investors, whether 
‘sophisticated’ or not, to act without expending a lot of time or resources.  
 
It is for this reason that the ESMA’s focus on enforcing competition within this sector will 
not work. There have been other measures proposed with regards to enforcing the dissolution 
of the Big Three’s dominance – with the enforced usage of non-profit agencies being one 
suggestion13 – but that has yet to bear any fruit either. This understanding of the rating 
industry as representing a ‘natural oligopoly’ is often, and somewhat strangely ignored or 
dismissed by regulators and legislators – one can only presume that this is down to the need 
to be seen as doing something effectual in this particular arena. However, it is not effectual, 
and in fact is particularly damaging as it wastes valuable time and resources as the Big Three 
continue to seep into the fabric of the modern economy. What is required now, by the ESMA 
and the SEC in the U.S., is defined and forceful action – the time has passed for words like 
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Ultimately, we have seen how the ESMA has, rather politely, sought to remind industry 
participants of their legislative obligations, and herein lies the biggest issue of all. The 
misdirected focus of regulators is fermenting a culture of impudence that will soon be a 
standard if it is not corrected. Rather than focusing upon the wording of legislative agendas, 
and paying lip-service to the notion of enforcing competition in an environment where 
increased competition is simply not desired by any party other than those negatively affected 
by transgressions (the public), it is time for legislators and regulators to be firm. For far too 
long regulators and legislators have suggested the course of action for industry participants, 
and for far too long they have been blatantly ignored because of the lack of authority. If the 
ESMA wants to see an end to theseis repeated calls for obedience, then they must break from 
the crowd and truly enforce their will. It is not unimaginable to think that a regulator, with the 
help of legislators, could enforce the rule that anyone issuing structured finance products 
must use at least one rating agency that holds less than 10% of the market share; in no way is 
this unimaginable. Perhaps it is time regulators toughen up, take the expected backlash from 
industry participants and their lobbyists, and regulate for the good of the people they are paid 
to protect. 
